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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC OF RELIGION
MarciA. Hamilton*
The message of postmodernism is that we should carefully attend to the
language that we use. We should not expect the meaning of our words to
always accord with our intentions or to remain static.1 We are likely to be
surprised by language's subtle and unintended intonations. This could not be
more true for the discourse in the battle over the standard to be applied to free
exercises cases. The language of the standard that appears to be good for
religion--the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 2-- sends the message
that religion is weak and needy, while the standard that supposedly marks the
end of religious liberty--the Smith standard 3 -sketches a more accurate and
vital image of religion. I will turn first to a deconstruction of our discourse of
religion and then to the practical and doctrinal ramifications to be taken from
it.
I. THE DISCOURSE OF RELIGION IN LEGAL TEXTS
The common wisdom is that religion was necessarily better off under the
super-strict scrutiny test employed in the now-invalidated RFRA. Under
RFRA, if religious conduct was substantially burdened by any law, the
government or government actor was forced to prove that its interest was
"compelling" and that its means were the "least restrictive."' One could not
devise a more exacting constitutional test. The common wisdom says that the
compelling interest test and the least restrictive means test are good for religion
and good for liberty.
The common wisdom says the opposite about the standard announced by
the Court in Smith.5 In that case, the Court stated that the Constitution does not
require a government to accommodate incidental burdens on religious conduct
resulting from neutral, generally applicable laws.6 In other words, a govern-
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Princeton
Theological Seminary. Copyright © 1997 Marci A. Hamilton.
1. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989); JACQUES DERRIDA,
DISSEMINATION (Barbara Johnson trans., 198 1); JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY
(Alan Bass trans., 1982); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans.,
1976); JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (1994), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
3. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(l), (b)(2) (1994).
5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 ("[W]hat [this standard] would produce here-a private
right to ignore generally applicable laws-is a constitutional anomaly.").
6. See id. at 888-89.
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ment must "only" prove that its law is neutral and generally applicable to pass
muster. By contrast, when laws target religion or any particular religion for
disfavored treatment, traditional strict scrutiny kicks in.7 The common wisdom
holds this to be a disaster for religious liberty!
The rhetoric of the two tests, however, deserves more careful scrutiny.
Underneath the messages about the outcome of cases rests unexamined
presuppositions about religion, its power, and its role in society. Before
turning to the language itself, it is important to place the discourse in historical
context. The following five historical events are of some importance in
identifying what we mean when we speak today about religion in the political
and legal arenas.
1. The publication of Stephen Carter's The Culture of Disbelief9 In that
book, Professor Carter makes the argument that religion has been "trivialized"
in American society. He points to the secularization of popular and political
culture and argues for a revitalization of religion in the public sphere.10
Undoubtedly, his book hit chords in American society. President Clinton was
photographed holding the book aloft and has praised it more than once for the
press." The book's most apparent impact was that it persuaded politicians
around the country that they should be more solicitous of religion. That has
resulted in a growing avalanche of religious liberty lawmaking.12
2. Roughly and ironically at the same time, the Christian Coalition, the
right-leaning evangelicals, came into political power in this country.
7. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993); Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
8. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV.
221; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109, 1114-16 (1990); see also Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 559-77 (Souter J.,
concurring). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith & Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
9. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
10. See id. at 55 ("[AII of these efforts to limit the conversation to premises held in
common would exclude religion from the mix.").
11. See E.J. DIONNE, JR., THEY ONLY LOOK DEAD: WHY PROGRESSIVES WILL DOMINATE
THE NEXT POLITICAL ERA 164 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1994); The Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal
Workplace (1998) (visited Apr. 13, 1998) <http://w3.trib.com/FACT/
1 st.guideline.rel.work.html>; Memorandum on Religious Expression in the Public Schools
(1995) (visited Apr. 13, 1998) <http://w3.trib.com/FACT/Ist.pres.rel.html>; H.R. 3588, 105th
Cong. (1998); R.I. Gen. Laws. § 42-80.1 (West 1997); Ass. Bill No. 1617 (Cal. 1997) (amended
on Mar. 19, 1998); S. 1591, 90th Gen. Assembly (111. 1998); H.S. 167 (La. 1998); H.S. J. Res.




3. Before the Culture of Disbelief and continuing to now, the American
mainstream Protestant churches have found themselves in an alarming decline
at a time when Pentecostal and evangelical churches are booming. 3 The
mainstream churches are losing members at an astonishing rate and Protestant
hierarchies are losing credibility with their members. As an example,
contributions from Protestant members to their national organizations are
down, though giving to the local parish has remained demonstrably stronger.
This signals that there is an emerging problem in the hierarchies of the
Protestant churches and a concomitant gulf between believers and the
hierarchical leadership.
4. At the same time that the mainstream Protestant churches have been
experiencing difficulties, Congress raced to support RFRA as though the
representatives of organized religion who lobbied for RFRA necessarily
brought with them thousands if not millions of votes. An impressive array of
organized religions banned together and chose a name that is not altogether
surprising in light of the Christian Coalition's success. They named themselves
the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, and lobbied Congress to pass
RFRA for the good of religion. 4 A virtually unanimous Congress passed the
law.'5 The law was then struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores,16 and we
have been treated ever since to dire warnings for religious liberty from every
comer of the religious community. I am told that the Coalition now has all 50
states in its sights to enact mini-RFRA's so that religion will be able to survive.
5. Finally, stretching back in history, the pre-Reformation Catholic
Church was castigated by reformers for the abuse of its essentially monopolis-
tic power, for its unresponsiveness to its members and for the profligate actions
of its clergy. The foundations of the Protestant churches squarely rest on a
belief that the church polity is capable of error and that churches should be both
responsible and accountable to their members. The Framers, and particularly,
James Madison, were acutely aware that religious sects can act like factions and
crafted the Constitution to channel religion's force in a constructive manner and
to protect the government from its overwhelming power. 7 This last fact I
raised because its essential truth seems to have been forgotten in the coming
together of the discourse over the Culture of Disbelief and RFRA.
13. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religion's Reach, THE CHRIsTIAN CENTURY, July 16-23,
1997, at 644.
14. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion in support
of Respondents, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 95-2074).
15. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14461, S14471 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (97-3).
16. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
17. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitution's Pragmatic Balance of Power Between
Church and State, NEXUS: A JOURNAL OF OPINION, Fall 1997, at 33.
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I have juxtaposed these historical events to make the point that in our
society religion sometimes looks quite powerful politically, and sometimes it
is depicted as less powerful. We are told that it is trivialized but we know that
it was a monolith of power as RFRA was drafted, lobbied for, and litigated in
the lower courts.'" The extraordinarily effective political pressure they exerted
following the Smith decision should make one pause before one accedes to the
marginalization or trivialization thesis.
Religion is one of the most authoritative structures of human existence
and holds great potential power to effect good and to effect bad.
In the debate regarding the Free Exercise Clause, there is an
unacknowledged split between two disparate ways of viewing religion. One
side (the side purportedly on religion's and liberty's side) treats religion as
weak, while the other (the one purportedly on government's side) treats
religion as strong. RFRA was supposed to be the better standard for religion,
and Smith the worse. The subtext was that the former was good for liberty and
the latter was not. The rhetoric of the competing standards, however, sends a
different message. The rhetoric of RFRA is not in religion's interest because
it depicts religion as a weak servant. Nor is it in society's interest because it
paints religion as a necessarily weak child in the political system, which is not
true. The RFRA standard itself marginalizes religion.
In contemporary discussions regarding religious liberty, it is too often said
that religion needs "space." If government simply would not regulate when
religion enters the picture, so the story goes, if it would just leave room for
religion, everything would be okay.' 9 RFRA, we are told, did not really affect
the state. Rather, it simply directed government to engage in an absence of
regulation whenever religion was affected, as though absence of regulation is
a vacuum and not an affirmative decision not to regulate.20
The language of RFRA reflected this ideology. The Act stated that
government cannot enforce its generally applicable, neutral law if that law is
not the "least restrictive means" as applied to this particular believer.2' The
rhetorical message of the space metaphor and of the least restrictive means test
18. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995); see also Marci A.
Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse under
Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 357 (1994).
19. See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY
L.J. 43 (1997); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REv. 883, 884-85 (1994).
20. See Brief for Respondent at 46-47, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)
(No. 95-2074); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313 (1996); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REv. 221,
229-31 (1993).
21. See42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
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is that religion is anemic. It cannot withstand society's presence, and the only
way for it to survive is if the society turns away and pretends that it does not
exist or at least endeavors to make as much room as it possibly can so that
religion will not be hurt.
The message of RFRA was that society must structure itself so that
religion can thrive. Religion, on this reading, has no resources to protect its
interests and therefore needs the right to exile the state from its geographical,
political, and spiritual domains. The Act was supposedly necessary because
Smith left claims for religious conduct in conflict with generally applicable
laws to the political process.22 On this reading, religious believers are
politically ineffectual and lack fundamental people skills. They are
uncooperative, selfish, and incapable of negotiating or understanding the
demands made upon them by communities living with them cheek to jowl.
They must hide so that they will not be bruised.
Comparatively, under the RFRA scenario, the state is an authoritarian
monolith whose policies are rooted in bad motives and frivolous policy
concerns. It is a collection of unaccountable bureaucrats who are incapable of
acknowledging or understanding the force of a religion's request for exemption.
The overbearing monster of the state stands over and above weak, cowering
religion. RFRA was to be religion's shield in this morality play reminiscent of
Jack and the Beanstalk.
If there were ever a rhetorical strategy that is guaranteed to feed the
perception of religion's marginalization, RFRA was it. The compelled
exemption theory, which Michael McConnell has articulated, suffers even more
from this defect-its operation is supposed to be automatic, rendering religion
not only weak but also mute in the political sphere.23
The rhetoric of religious weakness is repeated in the outcry over the Smith
decision. In Smith, two drug counselors were fired for smoking peyote in a
Native American ceremony because the state had a law prohibiting drug
counselors from using illegal drugs.24 This decision was considered an outrage.
Yet, why does society have to guarantee a drug counseling job to individuals
who use peyote for any reason? The context of the debate seems to assume
that these religious believers were not sturdy enough to find a different job, say
in the private sector. Rather, they needed the law to make the system fit to
22. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CI. L. REV.
115 (1992); Rod M. Fliegel, Free Exercise Fidelity and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993: Where We Are, Where We Have Been, and Where We Are Going, 5 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 39 (1994).
23. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1990).
24. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
1998]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
them. The concept of sacrifice for religion is emptied of all content by this
discourse. Forget martyrdom; these religious believers are saying that they
cannot be asked to make any adjustment for religion. Moreover, they did not
have the political wherewithal to ask for an exemption from the law until they
were told that the Constitution would not automatically protect them?2
Following Smith and the accompanying outcry, the mask of weakness was
lifted and the force of religion's claim on society was witnessed as the federal
government, Oregon, and other states passed laws exempting the use of peyote
for religious purposes from general narcotics laws.2 6 Aided by other religious
groups, the Native American Church exercised its political muscle and obtained
exemptions at the state and federal levels.
Contrast the rhetoric of RFRA with that of Smith wherein religion has the
strength to enter the political battlefield and to secure the accommodations
most important to it. The vision of religion underlying Smith is a vision of a
vital, politically active, and capable social force.27 Religion is not a separate,
isolated entity, far removed from the rest of society. It is not a hothouse flower
that must be carefully cultivated and shielded from every draft, but rather a
hardy plant that can thrive even when planted in rocky soil.
The religion portrayed in Smith is also a constitutive element of the
society that inevitably interacts with communities and honors their desires
when appropriate. It is a responsible and accountable member of the political
community.
While the state in Smith is not the monolithic monster portrayed by
RFRA, 28 it is no weakling. The decision in Smith provides some bright-line
rules that are not to be breached. First, belief will not be imposed, coerced, or
dictated by the state. It is absolutely protected.29 The reality informing the
25. See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1994) (exempting members of the Native American Church
from the federal drug laws for their religious use of peyote); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402
(1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-22-317 (3) (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-
6(D) (Michie 1989) (exempting "the use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies by a bona
fide religious organization."); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § § 481.111 (Vernon 1991).
26. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5), (6) (Supp. 1992); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 481.111 (Vernon 1991); ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402 (West 1984); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-22-317(3) (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (Michie 1989)
(exempting "the use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies by a bona fide religious
organization.").
27. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
28. The recurrent theme in the defense of RFRA is that all government actors are
thoughtless "bureaucrats." I have heard this defense in many of the debates in which I have
participated regarding RFRA. See, e.g., Roger Pilon, Is the RFRA Constitutional?, Cato Policy
Report, May/June 1997 (debate between myself and Kevin J. Hasson of Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty on February 18, 1997).
29. This has always been part of the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 ("Laws[- ... cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions
624 [Vol. 20
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absolute protection of belief is that if the state can succeed in dictating belief,
then religion will become the weakling depicted in the RFRA rhetoric.
Categorical protection for belief is an absolute prerequisite if there is to be a
level playing field between religion and the state.3°
Second, the state cannot persecute religions or religion per se.3 , If it is
found as an empirical matter that a government is targeting a particular religion
for disfavored treatment or even religion in general for disfavored treatment,
the government's action will be subjected to the most searching scrutiny and in
all likelihood declared invalid.32 The reality here is that religious persecution
is an undeniable component of history and the power of the state must be
curtailed from this historically documented temptation.33
Third, when the state makes individualized determinations under a law,
and therefore holds the potential to engage in unfettered discretion, the
determination reached is subject to searching scrutiny?4 Fourth, when the state
regulates combined, or hybrid, constitutional rights, its actions will be closely
monitored.35
Thus, the state is subject to significant restraints in circumstances where
its temptation and potential to do harm to constitutional interests are at their
height.
Under the Smith scenario, when the government is not persecuting, when
it is not engaging in an attempt at mind-control or soul-control, when its
individualized discretion is at a minimum, and when hybrid rights are not at
stake, then religion is forced into the political process to justify itself and to
attempt to find solutions that can benefit both the church and the community.
If a church wants to build an addition in a historical preservation district, under
.) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879)). See also McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ("The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.");
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
30. Thus, the debate over the standard to be applied in free exercise cases is only a debate
about religious conduct. Like Smith, RFRA is limited to conduct.
31. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
32. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546.
33. See Leonard W. Levy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (2d. ed 1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability
of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religion Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV.
1245, 1271 (1994) (arguing that susceptibility of religion to persecution provides grounds for
constitutional protection but not privileging religion); Steven G. Gay, Why Is Religion Special?
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PITr. L. REV. 75, 148 (1990).
34. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872
(1990).
35. See id. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
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the Smith regime, the church must articulate its needs. It must persuade the
community that it is not being shortchanged for no good reason. It is simply
not enough for religion to say, "I want it.", Nor should it be. Church and state,
under Smith, stand as equal entities, each with valid and important claims that
require public airing and mutual accommodation. Each challenges the other
to justify itself. In Professor Milner Ball's imagery, they are engaging in an
isometric exercise that mutually strengthens both.36 Smith hopes for win-win
solutions, rather than adversarial court contests, unlike RFRA which gives
religion such a leg up that churches are understandably tempted to refuse
constructive dialogue and to embrace stubbornly their initial, potentially
unreflective position.
The most salutary message to be taken from Smith's imagery of religion
is that religion is, in Niklas Luhmann's terms, autopoietic.37 Religion is "a
social system [that] can be differentiated as constituting [itself]
self-referentially through the development of [its] own separate symbolically
generalized media of communication."" Yet, it is not solely self-referential,
i.e., it is not Habermasian. 39 Luhmann points out that autopoietic systems can
be simultaneously open and closed to the contextual environment. Thus,
religion is inevitably constructed on an infrastructure that includes meaningful
communication with other elements of the society. At the same time, it is also
self-defining such that it can be distinguished from other autopoietic systems
within the society.' Religion is not the atomistic, self-referential structure
envisioned by RFRA or the compelled exemption theory but rather a
constitutive element of the society that is in part defined by society and that in
turn defines aspects of society. In other words, there can be meaningful
communication between religion and society.4'
Surely, Smith's vision of religion as a constitutive element of society is
closer to the Framers' vision than the radically atomistic vision presupposed
and engendered by RFRA. The colonial generation believed that religion is an
important and vital civilizing force.42 They viewed Christianity as a necessary
36. See MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 73
(1985).
37. See NIKLAS LuHMANN, ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION 13-14, 23, 64, 65 (John
Bednarz, Jr. trans., 1989).
38. Seeid. atxi.
39. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1995).
40. See LuHMANN, supra note 37, at xi. Systems are recursively closed but also exhibit
environmentally open irritability. See id.
41. Of course, many religions are premised on the concept of service to society. For
example, Christianity. For those religions, the RFRA imagery of religion as weak and as timid
in upon itself operates as a barrier to the fulfillment of theological goals.
42. See Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71
626 [Vol. 20
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cement that would make the United States cohere. Justice Scalia's opinion in
Smith captures the flavor of that vision and provides a vivid juxtaposition with
the cowering image of religion evoked by RFRA and compelled exemption
theories.
In sum, RFRA's standard runs the risk of either marginalizing religion or
masking its true power to the detriment of society. The Smith rhetoric is more
realistic and safer for society because it forces religion to justify itself when its
conduct impinges on generally applicable law.
II. THE DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
THE DISCOURSE OF RELIGION IN LEGAL TEXTS
As one who truly cares about religious liberty (but obviously not for
RFRA), I think it is now time to take a no-nonsense look at Smith in practice.
For the following three reasons, both the states and the federal government
should put off legislative action until we know more, more about Smith in
practice and more about the state of religious liberty in the United States and
the several states.
From a structural standpoint, we need to be most concerned when religion
wraps itself in the garb of trivialization and marginalization as it flexes its
considerable political muscle in legislative backrooms. That is when
representatives are most sorely tempted to abandon their role as independent
trustees of the people's interest.43 In those circumstances, the legislature's
superior factfinding capacities and investigative facilities need to be exercised
to their hilt.
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Whether Federal or State, Is
an Inappropriate Legislative Enactment
A religious freedom restoration act, federal or state, is a parcel of legal
problems, from separation of powers to the Establishment Clause." Given the
B.U. L. REv. 455 (1991).
43. See Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth
of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 477 (1994)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions].
44. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) ("RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance."); id. at 2172
(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause because "the
statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First
Amendment."). See also Marci A. Hamilton, Boerne v. Flores: A Landmark for Structural
Analysis, WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 1998); Marci A. Hamilton, RFRA is
Unconstitutional, Period, I U. PA. CONST. L.J. (forthcoming 1998); Marci A. Hamilton, The
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unequivocal message sent by the Court in Boerne,45 the insistence of the
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion in pressing forward on state laws
that mimic RFRA is bewildering.
The federal act, like the state proposals, attacked the perceived problems
posed by Smith with a one-size-fits-all solution. 6 Religious liberty is too
important to be adjusted in this slap-dash fashion, in the absence of evidence
of its necessity (which might justify constitutional amendment), and in the
absence of a sustained public debate. The end of the federal Constitution is a
pragmatic balance of power between church and state.47 That balance should
not be effected through ignorance.
Although religion's representatives drafted RFRA, citizens never
understood the legalese of RFRA.48 No government should be able to adjust
the balance of power between church and state across the board in one fell
sweep. Such adjustments require ratification by the people. A RFRA-like
statute offends the core constitutional value of popular sovereignty and invites
constitutional invalidation. If unjustified and substantial burdens on religious
conduct truly exist, there are other means available to alleviate such burdens,
for example, meaningful negotiation between government and religion when
conduct and law collide, the individualized exemptions for particular problems
adverted to in Smith and constitutional amendment.49  The anecdotes of
religious persecution in the 1992 and 1993 federal hearings could have been
redressed by a handful of particularized legislation, rather than the sweeping
readjustment of church-state power dictated by the judicial standard codified
in RFRA. °
Constitution's Pragmatic Balance of Power Between Church and State, NEXUS: A JOURNAL
OF OPINION, Fall 1997, at 33.
45. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171 ("[RFRA] imposes in every case a least restrictive
means requirement... which also indicates that the legislation is broader than is appropriate
if the goal is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.").
46. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 ("Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every
level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description
and regardless of subject matter.").
47. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitution's Pragmatic Balance of Power Between
Church and State, NEXUS, A JOURNAL OF OPINION, Fall 1997, at 33.
48. See Marci A. Hamilton, Boerne v. Flores: A Landmarkfor Structural Analysis, WM.
& MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
49. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("Values that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political
process.").
50. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169 (referring to "anecdotes" in legislative history of
RFRA); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, Hearings on H.R. 2797 before
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 81 (1993) (statement of Nadine Strossen); id. at 107-110 (statement of William
Yang); id. at 118 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz); id., at 336 (statement of Douglas
Laycock); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Hearing on S. 2969 before the Senate
[Vol. 20
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Governments need to determine the true state of religious liberty in
American society before they adjust church-state relations. This requires
examination of the law's impact on religion in particularized settings. Yet, this
prerequisite simply cannot be met under the RFRA-type law, which applies to
every law, every government actor, whether the government action was taken
before or after RFRA was enacted. For example, had Congress thought
carefully about RFRA, it would have inquired into the vast variety of instances
in which churches bump into federal law. A balanced approach to RFRA as
applied to federal law would have considered religion vs. environmental law,5
religion vs. tax law, 2 religion vs. copyright law,53 religion vs. national parks
law,54 religion vs. government provision of services,5 religion vs. federal drug
laws, etc., etc.56 To the rejoinder that such an inquiry would have been
impossible, the correct, constitutional answer, is that the impossibility of the
inquiry proves the infeasibility of the law. The longer the rfra concept
survives, the more aware the various affected interests are becoming. The
proposed Maryland rfra was withdrawn in the wake of concerns expressed by
perhaps the widest group of dissenters to date. 7
RFRA's scope made it an amendment to the Constitution without the
involvement of the people, a stealth amendment, if you will. Congress did not
engage its constitutional obligation to engage in independent decisionmaking
in the best interests of the people when it focused its attention almost
exclusively- on religion and not on the other important government interests it
is charged by the Constitution with furthering, e.g., commerce, the environ-
ment, intellectual property, tax law, and so on.58  The path to RFRA's
invalidation was laid by Congress's irresponsible and hasty conduct. If the
states, and Congress, seek to avoid further invalidations, they must temper their
eagerness to please religion with their obligation to serve the people's interests.
Once they acknowledge that obligation, the wheels of the state and federal
Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 5-6, 14-26 (1993) (statement of William Yang); id.,
at 27-28 (statement of Hmong-Lao Unity Assn., Inc.); id. at 50 (statement of Baptist Joint
Committee); 117 S. Ct. at 2169 (referring to "anecdotes" in legislative history of RFRA).
51. Cf. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 544 (addressing the State's interest of sanitation
law and the public health).
52. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
53. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1353, 1355-57 (E.D. Va. 1995);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.N.E.T., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1468, 1472 (D. Colo. 1995).
54. Cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
55. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
56. Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874; United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1480-84 (10th Cir.
1996).
57. See Hearings on H.S. J. Res. 13, Mar. 6, 1998 (testimony by American Academy of
Pediatricians, Child Advocacy, Prisons, Prisons Guards, Schools, and Counties).
58. See Hamilton, Discussions and Decisions, supra note 43.
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legislators should slow to a more reasonable speed and the inquiries should
become more careful and more measured.59
B. Religious Persecution is Not Sufficiently Likely to Justify Federal or
State Legislative Action at This Time
In light of existing constitutional doctrine and the proven political power
of religion, the concerns expressed about religious persecution in this country
seem overblown.' The Court's decision in Smith is not quite the bright-line
rule disabling religion that is depicted by the supporters of the federal and state
RFRAs.s1 For one thing, the Court's pre-Smith doctrine was not the haven for
religious conduct portrayed by the RFRA supporters.62 In Smith itself, neutral,
generally applicable laws are to be subjected to strict scrutiny if they are a mere
pretext for persecution and targeting, or if a claim involves a hybrid of
constitutional values, or if the scheme requires particularized official
decisionmaking that lends itself to an abuse of discretion. 63 Thus, Smith's
standard, especially when molded by creative lawyering, is likely to lose its
straight-edge image to become a more expansive and flexible tool for the
adjustment of power between church and state.
Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, was on to something in Smith when
he said that we need not worry too much about religious conduct when it
bumps up against generally applicable laws because, in general, this society is
59. This can already be seen in California and Maryland, where the proposed legislation
has alerted a diverse array of interests.
60. There is no question that religious persecution remains a problem around the world,
even in westernized countries like Germany. See Germany to Put Scientology Under Scrutiny,
WASH. POST, June 7, 1997, at A20; Ray Moseley, In Germany, Scientology Distrusted and Very
Unwelcome, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1997, at 1; see also Michael R. Gordon, Russians Pass Bill
Sharply Favoring Orthodox Church: Other Christians Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept., 20, 1997, at A1;
Daniel Williams, Faith-Curbing Bill Becomes Law in Russia: Restrictions on Religion Enacted
in Face of Global Criticism, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1997, at A16.
61. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 9-10,
54.
62. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free
Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 746-49 (1993).
63. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 540-42. This latter point is reminiscent of the
Court's approach in its First Amendment zoning cases. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493
U.S. 215 (1990) (discussing procedural safeguards of local discretion impacting First
Amendment protected liberties); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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solicitous of religious claims.64 The Smith fallout, including RFRA and the
state and federal peyote exemptions, bear witness to this.
65
The Smith decision and its discordant reception sent me back to James
Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention to divine whether the Smith
perspective on religion would have been alien to the Framers. As I stated
earlier, they believed religion would and could have significant political
leverage.66 At this point, there is reason to be more concerned about the abuse
of political power by religion than about religion's suppression.
C. Minority Religions Are Not at Risk as a Result of the Smith Decision
Minority religions also do not appear to be in the position of peril claimed
by those attempting to enact mini-RFRAs at the state level.67 Political scientist
Mancur Olson made a persuasive case that small, organized groups do better
in the legislative process than disorganized majorities.68 When one adds the
Supreme Court's decision in Lukumi Babalu Aye to this reality69 and to the
existence of the Coalition, which ought to turn its attention to riding herd for
small as well as mainstream religions, the fear of minority religion suppression
dims considerably.
In sum, as Professor Lupu also has urged, it would be worthwhile to wait
to see how the Smith doctrine actually plays itself out in the courts.70
Legislative action is premature at many levels.
III. CONCLUSION
What we say is not always what we mean. But our words shape our
worldviews nonetheless. In the debate over the free exercise standard, there is
64. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("[A] society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as
well.").
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 ("Granting ... exemptions, to the extent permissible under
the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter."); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3402 (West 1989); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-22-317(3) (West 1991 & Supp.
1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (Michie 1989) (providing exemption for "the use of
peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies by a bona fide religious organization").
66. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
67. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REv.
221, 230 (1993); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15,
55.
68. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144 (2d ed. 1971).
69. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547.




significant ambiguity about the sociological and political status of religion.
When it comes to characterizing religion, the vision painted by Smith of
religion as a vital social force is more accurate than RFRA's anemic portrait. 71
Thus, Boerne signals not a requiem for religious liberty, but rather a structural
constitutional landmark saving us from our own best intentions.72
71. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 ("Precisely because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up
of people of almost every conceivable religious preference; ... and precisely because we value
and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively
invalid ... every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.")
(quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
72. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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